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Abstract—Fifth Generation (5G) telecommunication system is
going to deliver a flexible radio access network (RAN). Security
functions such as authorization, authentication and accounting
(AAA) are expected to be distributed from central clouds to edge
clouds. We propose a novel architectural security solution that
applies to 5G networks. It is called Trust Zone (TZ) that is
designed as an enhancement of the 5G AAA in the edge cloud.
TZ also provides an autonomous and decentralized security policy
for different tenants under variable network conditions. TZ also
initiates an ability of disaster cognition and extends the security
functionalities to a set of flexible and highly available emergency
services in the edge cloud.
Index Terms—5G, AAA, security, architecture, SDN, NFV.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fifth generation (5G) is expected to develop a flexible radio
access network (RAN) and to provide the necessary adapt-
ability for handling the fluctuations in the traffic demands. It
is also intended to deliver an independent control of logical
network slice and to provide an isolatable network resource for
the tenants with their plethoric network services (e.g., voice
network services, vehicles network services, the Internet of
Things network services etc.).
These ambitions have lead to a requirement of high degrees
of flexibility and decentralization in the network security
functions, such as authentication, authorization and accounting
(AAA). Supported by the modern technology of network func-
tion virtualization (NFV), a novel hierarchical and distributed
AAA approach, the 5G AAA, has been proposed. It combines
two independent international standard systems that are the
Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) and the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), as a single
platform to manage and secure the subscribers, tenants and
network slices under the 5G flexible network environment. By
distributing databases to all edge clouds, it enables a flexible
and decentralized decision and application of security policies
in every edge cloud.
However, concentrating on the vertical dimension of its
hierarchical topology, the proposed 5G AAA approach lacks
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details about its horizontal implementation in the edge clouds.
It still remains ambiguous for the edge clouds, how to coor-
dinate the administrations of the hierarchical and distributed
AAA servers, or the accesses to the hierarchical and distributed
subscriber databases. This issue becomes even more complex,
when considering that the connections between edge clouds
and central clouds may be restricted under certain conditions,
which increases the difficulty of network function management
and brings an extra risk of data leakage in.
In this paper, we propose a Trust Zone (TZ) as an edge cloud
architectural solution, to horizontally enrich and extend the 5G
AAA approach. With a state model depending on the central
cloud availability, TZ is able to adaptively manage its security
administration and database accesses. By building an entity
model with five functional modules, we seamlessly integrate
the TZ design with the 5G AAA architecture. To mitigate
security risks during reconnection between central cloud and
edge cloud, we propose a safe approach of transferring the
access management between central cloud and edge cloud.
This paper is organized as follow: as a background, in
Sec. II and Sec. III we briefly introduce the overall 5G
network architecture and the 5G AAA approach, respectively.
Subsequently, as the main focus of this work, the Trust Zone
design is presented in Sec. IV, including its concept, use
cases, state model and entity model. Afterwards, the access
management transferring approach is discussed in Sec. V,
before we close this article with our conclusion in Sec. VI.
II. 5G MOBILE NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
A. The 3GPP NextGen Architecture
In [2], the 3GPP technical specification group on architec-
ture (SA2) currently works on the high-level system architec-
ture as the collection of required capabilities, and high level
functions with their interactions between each other. Among
others, it proposes the non-roaming ”NextGen Architecture”
consisting of the following high-level functions: authentication
server function (AUSF), unified data management (UDM),
core access and mobility management function (AMF), session
management function (SMF), policy control function (PCF),
user plane functions (UPF) and RAN. Further, agreements on
the key issue of network slicing indicate that the RAN can be
common to multiple network slices. For the core network, SA2
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differentiates between common control network functions and
dedicated control functions, while the user plane is generally
assumed to be dedicated to a specific slice.
B. The 5G PPP Architectures
5G Infrastructure Public Private Partnership (5G PPP) Ar-
chitecture working group has proposed five different archi-
tecture views and a so-called Network Softwarization and
Programmability Framework to facilitate the development of
the 5G network architecture [4]. The former focus on the
various relevant perspective on 5G system design, which are
the application and business service view, infrastructure control
view, logical & functional view, physical resources view, and
system management view. The latter introduces a separation
into five planes that enable programmable, softwarized net-
works: Application and Business Service Plane, Multi-Service
Management Plane, Integrated Network Management & Op-
erations Plane, Infrastructure Softwarization Plane, Infrastruc-
ture Control Plane, and Forwarding (Data) Plane. However,
[4] lacks detailed considerations for the security domain. In
particular, the question of how to realize ”Security by Design”
needs to be answered. While 5G concepts aim at transferring
the flexibility of software-defined and virtualized network
functionality to the telecommunication domain, they at the
same time increase the risk for experiencing security threats
known from IT environments, e.g., threatening confidentiality,
data integrity, and network availability, or the possibility of
mis-allocation of resources among multiple network tenants.
C. Security Components in the 5G NORMA Architecture
Fig. 1 depicts the 5G NORMA overall architecture, com-
prising four layers: the service layer, management & orches-
tration layer, control layer, and data layer [3]. The main
Fig. 1: High-level 5G NORMA functional architecture
design goals for the 5G NORMA architecture comprise adap-
tive (de-)composition and allocation of network functions,
programmable network behavior, as well as joint optimiza-
tion of network functions. Applying a systematic design ap-
proach ensures that the 5G NORMA architecture will securely
implement multi-tenant, multi-service networks, building on
enabling technologies, such as, multi-level network slicing
and software-defined network control and management. More
specifically, the authors propose a hierarchical and distributed
5G AAA and Trust Zone concept as an inherent component
of the 5G network architecture. Fig. 2 shows a basic sce-
nario of the 5G PPP logical framework control, management
and orchestration of network functions integrated with 5G
AAA. Basically, it adopts the ETSI NFV entities, i.e. Virtual
Infrastructure Manager (VIM), VNF Manager (VNFM) and
NFV Orchestrator (NFVO), and the ONF SDN programmable
control layer and data layer. The two layers comprise both
common and dedicated network functions. While common
control and data layer functions are shared by multiple net-
work slices, dedicated control and data layer functions are
specifically allocated to a single network slice. In the following
Fig. 2: 5G AAA approach (V-AAA Manager and V-AAA)
integrates with 5G PPP Architecture with no tenant and
network slice.
sections, we will take a step-by-step approach to explain our
approach of the 5G AAA hierarchical and distributed V-AAA,
and the details of Trust Zone interfaces and functionalities.
III. 5G AUTHENTICATION-AUTHORIZATION-ACCOUNTING
In this section, we discuss the 5G AAA design bases on
the 3GPP AKA, non-3GPP EAP-AKA, and ETSI NFV, reuse
of the existing cryptographic functions in 3GPP and tokeniza-
tion technique in OpenStack KeyStone, and provision of the
remote method invocation to other network entities and billing
platform for subscribers, tenants and tenant’s subscribers.
The 5G AAA is: (i) to assist tenants isolation and tenant
data isolation, (ii) to support tenant’s data replication in many-
to-one manner from the access network (edge cloud) to core
network (central cloud) and local bi-directional replication
approaches within tenant’s network slice, and (iii) to maintain
the central governance in the mobile network operator (MNO)
core network and when tenant has been authorized to have
a full control of their network slice which tenant can also
manage their subscribers in the access network (edge cloud).
In this situation, 5G AAA may or may not need to share
and move some of the core network functionalities [e.g.,
access and mobility management function (AMF) or local
subscriber server (LSS)] to the access network (edge cloud)
which depends on the service level agreement (SLA). It would
also provide a better accuracy of UE point of attachment
information under the complex of the Next Generation Mo-
bile Networks (NGMN) multi-tenancy, multi-network slicing,
multi-level service and multi-connectivity environment [1].
Last but not least, the additional objective is to increase the
mobility efficiency of subscribers at the access network (edge
cloud) and to reduce the traffic between access network (edge
cloud) and core network (central cloud).
Subsequently, the 5G AAA approach converts the traditional
macro-management to a micromanagement per-regional based
or even per-tenant based. For example, traditionally, MNO
applies and uses the 3GPP AKA as an enforcement of the
overall security management that remains at the core network,
then release the partial right to the access network via different
level of cryptographic functions. In contrast, the 5G AAA takes
a hierarchical, distributed and dedicated security management
approach that can be located within the current LTE eNodeB
and only responsible for security management within the
eNodeB region. It can also be located within tenant’s network
slice then the security management responsibility scope is
the entire Tenant’s network slice. Furthermore, it depends
on the MNO and Tenant to configure the scope of security
management and to locate the V-AAA entity in the edge cloud.
This 5G AAA approach also enhances the flexibility in security
management, the accuracy of tracking information i.e. mobility
and billing information etc., and the isolation of a tenants end-
user based on its own geolocation database, which is equivalent
to the current LTE eNodeB locations. For example, the first
security goal in 3GPP (authentication) is to verify the UEs
identity. While legacy networks perform this verification in
the core network, the functionality could be shifted to the
edge cloud. A comprehensive explanation of the hierarchical
and distributed databases approach for subscribers, tenant and
tenants subscribers, and under different network integrations
of V-AAA into 5G PPP architecture framework are given in
section 2.
IV. TRUST ZONE
A. Definition of Trust Zone
In previous section, we discussed the 5G AAA architecture
is expected to provide AAA functions flexibly and distributed,
in order to support a fully autonomous policy implementa-
tion covering the central clouds and the edge clouds. As a
connection between edge cloud and central cloud may be -
intentionally or unintentionally - restricted, congested or even
cut off, the functional availability of edge clouds shall be
decoupled from the central cloud to the utmost extent.
Fig. 3: Trust Zone integrated with edge cloud V-AAA server
Motivated by this challenge, we propose the concept of Trust
Zone (TZ), which is defined as a set of network functions
covering a geographical area served by a local cell i.e. an
edge cloud. In a TZ, different policies are autonomously
implemented to ensure data security, while as many services as
possible can be provided, regardless of the connection status
between this edge cloud and the central cloud. Due to the
concern of tenant dependency requirements in AAA services,
multiple individual TZs are able to coexist in one edge cloud,
each TZ for a different tenant.
The TZ strongly relies on distributed AAA functions, it is
tightly integrated with the V-AAA framework. Generally, a
TZ is an edge cloud V-AAA server extended with network
monitoring function and emergency services.
B. Use Cases
An architectural solution to distributed security and emer-
gency services, TZ widely plays a role in many 5G communi-
cation use cases, where critical communications happen within
the local edge cloud, and the intra-edge-cloud connections
can remain available under a limited or absent edge-cloud-to-
central-cloud connection (EC4). These use cases are including
not limited to industry control, sensor networks monitor-
ing, massive nomadic/mobile machine-type-communication,
vehicle-to-anything (V2X) communications, and emergency
communications [3].
C. State Model
To describe the behavior of TZ, a state model is built. At an
arbitrary time instant, according to the status of EC4, a Trust
Zone is in one of the following five states: Connected (C),
Weakly Connected (W), Lost connection (L), Reconnecting
(R) and Disconnecting (D). In the state C, the EC4 remains
available and healthy as normal. In W, the EC4 remains
available, but too weak to completely maintain the usual set of
network functions that need support of central cloud security
functions. When the state is L, the EC4 remains unavailable,
i.e. no message exchange between the edge cloud and the
central cloud can be executed. R presents that the EC4 has
just been recovered from an usual status. D means that the
EC4 was in a normal or weak status, but has just vanished.
Possible transitions between different states are illustrated in
Fig. 4. The states C, W and L are steady states, in which the
TZ can remain for a certain duration. R and D are transient
states, which last for only a short time before the TZ state
turns into C and L, respectively. Normally, a TZ remains
in its C state. When affected by congestions, disasters or
attacks, the TZ may turn into its W or L state. Usually,
the EC4 becomes significantly weaker before it completely
vanishes, which can be represented by a C-W-D-L transition
chain. Only in rare cases, a healthy EC4 can be completely
and immediately disconnected, which is described by a C-
D-L transition chain. When the EC4 is recovered, the state
turns back through a W-R-C or L-W-R-C transition chain. We
consider an immediate full recovery of EC4 from a complete
disconnection as impossible, the L-R transition is therefore
invalid in our state model.
Fig. 4: The TZ state model. The abbreviations C, R, W, D
and L stand for the states Connected, Reconnecting, Weakly
Connected, Disconnecting and Lost Connection, respectively.
D. Entity Model
In a structural view, the functionalities needed to implement
a TZ are organized in five functional entities, which have
already been illustrated in Fig. 3. These entities, and the
interfaces connecting them, construct the entity model of TZ.
1) Central Cloud Connection Monitoring (CCCM): Ac-
cording to our state model, the state of a Trust Zone depends on
the EC4 status, which is monitored in real time by the CCCM
module. Generally, CCCM periodically visits the OSS and the
NFV-MANO, to evaluate and predict the EC4 status. Addition-
ally, in the TZ states W and L, i.e. when the EC4 is limited
or disconnected, CCCM tries to diagnose the malfunction.
This diagnose can be used by the software-defined network
(SDN) management to help recover the EC4 by deploying
backup resources, e.g. network redundancy and alternative
routes such as satellite links. A dynamic network resource
allocation in the SDN management can be also supported
by the EC4 information, so that in the TZ state W, special
network functions such as user authentication/authorization
and synchronization of subscriber data can obtain network
resources with higher priorities.
2) Zone Management (ZM): The central controlling entity
of TZ, TM is connected with every other TZ entity. It triggers
and coordinates the state transition in the entire TZ, when it
receives a report of change in the EC4 status. Integrated with
interfaces to the central cloud and to the UEs, it also collab-
orates with the AMF and the LAA to accomplish the Access
Stratum (AS) security procedures in the local base station.
When the EC4 is healthy (TZ state C), ZM cooperates with
the central cloud V-AAA server to provide normal security
services. When the EC4 is limited or unavailable (TZ states
W and L), decentralized AAA services are needed, ZM will
then collaborate with LAA instead of the central cloud.
3) Local Access Assistant (LAA): The LAA is responsible
to support a central-cloud-independent local user access pro-
cedure when the AMF is unavailable, by performing partial
functionalities of the AMF, e.g. deriving keys. LAA is deac-
tivated by the ZM when the TZ state is R, remains inactive
when C or W, and activated when D. In the TZ state L, it
remains active, exchanging control plane messages with the
UEs, deriving/updating the AS keys for them, and providing
them with other AS security services.To enable these functions,
the LAA makes use of the user security log files stored in the
local subscriber database, which are periodically updated and
synchronized with the hierarchical subscriber database in the
central cloud. The LAA is isolated from the ZM mainly due to
the security considerations, that the subscriber database should
be decoupled from the ZM, which is the central controller
of TZ and the main target of potential cyber-attacks. Its
functionalities are strictly limited in the AS domain, as the
NAS keys can only be generated in the central cloud.
4) Security Auditing (SA): MNOs usually keeps a log of
security critical operations for each user, these logs can be
audited to investigate all potential risks of illegal access and
cyber-attacks. Both the log database and the auditing centre
are usually located in the central cloud, so that they cannot
keep tracking the authentication and authorization operations
locally executed by the modules ZM and LAA in the TZ state
L. To close this gap and promise a seamless audit, the SA
module is implemented. It is activated by the ZM in the TZ
state D, recording all security critical operations in the state
L. These records can be either actively pushed to the central
auditing center in the state R, or passively pulled in the state
C upon need.
5) Emergency Services (ES): Considering the high capacity
and robustness of 5G backhaul networks, the appearance of
EC4 quality damage usually implies emergency situations,
which can cause a massive physical damage on the network
infrastructures and an impulsive peak of service demand,
e.g. earthquakes, fires, explosions, etc. A set of emergency
services can be defined, which help users avoid personal
injury and property damage under such disasters, even when
their devices cannot be authenticated or authorized. These
services include but are not limited to public disaster alarm,
evacuation guidance, positioning service, emergency call and
short message service (SMS).
Some functions on this list shall be only valid under specific
disasters, e.g. public disaster alarm and evacuation guidance.
Some others, such like SMS, shall be always available, but pro-
vided with different security policies under different situations.
The rest, such as emergency call, shall always remain available
without authentication and authorization, regardless of the
situation. To achieve this, the EM module receives the TZ state
information from the ZM, and collects disaster information
from public security infrastructures via the Internet-of-things
(IoT). According to the information, it autonomously makes
the security policy decision for each individual emergency
service. It also forwards the disaster information to the CCCM
to help diagnose the EC4 malfunctions.
6) Interfaces: To manage the exchange of data, messages
and commands among Trust Zone, V-AAA and other 5G
NORMA functional entities, a set of interfaces are defined,
as illustrated in Fig. 3:
• Cm-Ma enables CCCM to visit NFV-MANO for EC4
evaluation. When the EC4 is in error, CCCM also sends
the diagnose to NFV-MANO through it.
• Cm-Zm enables CCCM to report ZM about the EC4 status
and to get state transition messages from ZM.
• Es-Cm forwards disaster alarms from ES to CCCM.
• Es-Zm enables ZM to trigger TZ state transitions in ES.
• Io-Es delivers disaster alarms from IoT to ES.
• La-Ls delivers the synchronized local copies of user
profile from LSS to LAA.
• La-Sa enables SA to monitor the operations of LAA.
• Me-Zm allows ZM to receive keys derived by AMF.
• Os-Cm enables CCCM to visit OSS for EC4 evaluation.
• Zm-La delivers edge-cloud-derived keys from LAA to
ZM, and TZ state transition messages from ZM to LAA.
• Zm-Sa enables SA to monitor the operations of ZM.
• Zm-Ue allows ZM and UEs to exchange C-plane mes-
sages for the security procedure.
E. Integration with V-AAA
To integrate TZ with the aforementioned 5G AAA approach,
we first investigate the location of TZ entities. The function-
alities of ZM, LAA, SA and EM are limited in edge cloud.
They can be locally implemented. In contrast, CCCM must
be implemented over edge and central clouds, to realize the
EC4 evaluation. Then we consider their role in the 5G AAA
approach. The basic functionality set essential for local AAA
is covered by the entities ZM, LAA and SA, while CCCM
and EM only extend them with environment cognition and
special services. Hence, ZM, LAA and SA together constitute
the local V-AAA server, as shown in Fig. 3
V. SAFE APPROACH TO TRANSFER ACCESS MANAGEMENT
Compared to the V-AAA manager, local V-AAA servers are
less secured due to the incomplete set of security functional-
ities. Additionally, considering the large total number of the
local V-AAA servers, they also probably have less budget on
security measures. This brings a risk to the idea of distributing
security functions at the edge cloud. Social engineers may
initiate attacks to disconnect the central cloud and the edge
cloud, and may hack the local TZ, which is easier to target
than the central cloud. Then they might eventually try to obtain
access to the central cloud during the reconnection, when
the edge cloud hands its security functions back over to the
central cloud. To avoid this risk, an asymmetric approach of
transferring the access management between the central cloud
and the trust zone is designed as follows.
When a disconnection takes place (state D), the ZM con-
siders all UEs that have already been authenticated as trusted
devices. These devices are able to retain maximal access to
the TZ according to the respective policy under the current
situation, until they lose their connections to the edge cloud.
When a UE tries to access the TZ and the central cloud is
unavailable (state L), the ZM invocates the LAA and the LSS
to gain an access for the UE. If the subscriber data of the UE
is available in LSS and the security check is passed, the UE
can be considered as a trusted device. Otherwise, it remains
untrusted and is only granted the basic emergency services.
When the edge cloud is reconnected to the central cloud
(state R), the ZM disconnects all UEs in the local TZ in a pre-
scheduled order, so that the UEs have to be re-authenticated
and reauthorized by the central security server, in order to
regain full access.
With this mechanism, emergency services are ensured to
remain available for all users, edge cloud services are as much
attainable as possible for legal users, while fake devices are
prevented from accessing the central cloud.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provided a condense study of 5G PPP
logical architecture and the 5G potential AAA approach.
Particularly, we have proposed a novel approach Trust Zone
(TZ) as an edge cloud solution of distributed 5G security.
Through an EC4 quality estimation mechanism, the TZ method
cognitively enables the security functions in central or edge
clouds, and seamlessly integrated with the distributed V-
AAA in the edge cloud. By defining emergency services and
supporting external services e.g., IoT services, TZ improves
the security of 5G access network (edge cloud) in two aspects:
the flexibility of security management and the resistance to
disasters. The security risk is reduced by an asymmetric
approach of transferring the access management. Besides the
security issues discussed in this paper, the TZ also exhibits
potential of shifting other central cloud functionalities into
edge cloud, which could increase the network flexibility. For
future works, studies alike [5] on the implementation efficiency
of TZ on different edge computing platforms are expected.
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